NEXT-Up By W. Scott Malone -- The GOLDEN FLEECE:

NEXT-Up By W. Scott Malone -- The GOLDEN FLEECE:
AN EXCLUSIVE Report on the Top Secret Connection Between Ferdinand Marcos and the Oliver North White House ------->>> How Paul Wolfowitz Allowed the Deposed Philiphine Dictator to Pull the Biggest GOLD Heist in History.
Showing posts with label NSA. Show all posts
Showing posts with label NSA. Show all posts

Wednesday, July 6, 2011

William Scott Malone and Rory O'Connor: The (Other) Story Judith Miller Didn't Write

- OPEN SOURCE  US/1; ATTN:RT/66; US/30
Published 22 May 06, in WorldDefenseReview.com
[Originally published in NavySEALs.com, 18 May 2006]


The (Other) Story Judith Miller Didn't Write 
 
By William Scott Malone and Rory O'Connor
NavySEALs.com/MediaChannel.org
Special to World Defense Review
 
Introduction: On October 12, 2000, the guided missile destroyer USS Cole pulled into harbor for refueling in Aden, Yemen. Less than two hours later, suicide bombers Ibrahim al-Thawr and Abdullah al-Misawa approached the ship's port side in a small inflatable craft laden with explosives and blew a 40-by-40-foot gash in it, killing seventeen sailors and injuring thirty-nine others.

The attack on the Cole, organized and carried out by Osama bin Laden's al-Qaeda terrorist group, was a seminal but still murky and largely misunderstood event in America's ongoing "Long War." Two weeks prior, military analysts associated with an experimental intelligence program known as ABLE DANGER had warned top officials of the existence of an active Al Qaeda cell in Aden, Yemen. And two days before the attack, they had conveyed "actionable intelligence" of possible terrorist activity in and around the port of Aden to General Pete Schoomaker, then Commander in Chief of the United States Special Operation Command (SOCOM).

The same information was also conveyed to a top intelligence officer at the United States Central Command (CENTCOM), headed by the newly appointed General Tommy Franks. As CENTCOM commander, Franks oversaw all US Armed Forces operations in a twenty five-country region that included Yemen, as well as the Fifth Fleet to which the Cole was tasked.

It remains unclear what action, if any, top officials at SOCOM and CENTCOM took in response to the ABLE DANGER warnings about planned Al Qaeda activities in Aden harbor. None of the officials involved has ever spoken about the pre-attack warnings, and a post-attack forensic analysis of the episode remains highly classified and off-limits within the bowels of the Pentagon. Subsequent investigations exonerated the Cole's commander, Kirk Lippold, but Lippold's career has been ruined nonetheless. He remains in legal and professional limbo, with a recommended promotion and new command held up for the past four years by political concerns and maneuvering.

Meanwhile, no disciplinary action was ever taken against any SOCOM or CENTCOM officials. General Schoomaker was later promoted out of retirement to Chief of Staff, United States Army, and General Franks went on to lead the combat operations in Afghanistan and Iraq.

Enter Judith Miller, Pulitzer Prize-winning ex-New York Times reporter at the center of the ongoing perjury and obstruction of justice case involving former top White House official I. Lewis (Scooter) Libby. Miller spent eighty-five days in jail before finally disclosing that Libby was the anonymous source who confirmed to her that Valerie Plame was a CIA official, although Miller never wrote a story about Plame. 

Now, in an exclusive interview, Miller tells the details of how the attack on the Cole spurred her reporting on Al Qaeda and led her, in July 2001, to a still-anonymous top-level White House source, who shared top-secret NSA signals intelligence (SIGINT) concerning an even bigger impending Al Qaeda attack, perhaps to be visited on the continental United States. Ultimately, however, Miller never wrote that story either. But two months later – on September 11 – Miller and her editor at the Times, Stephen Engelberg, another Pulitzer Prize winner, both remembered and regretted the story they "didn't do." – ROC and WSM

Interview with Judy Miller: "I was working on a special project in 2000-2001 – trying to do a series on where Al Qaeda was, who Al Qaeda was, and what kind of a threat it posed to the US. In the beginning I thought it was going to be pretty straightforward, but it turned out to be anything but. And it took me a long, long time, and a lot of trips to the Middle East, and a lot of dead ends, before I finally understood how I could tell the story to the American people. It was a long-term investigative piece, which meant that for the most part, I didn't write articles on specific individual attacks – I was working the story ... 

"I was fairly persuaded that the attack on the Cole was an Al Qaeda operation, based on the sources that I was talking to, because I had no independent information, obviously. The people that I was covering ardently believed that Al Qaeda was behind a lot of these attacks on American forces and Americans throughout the Middle East that we were beginning to see. At the time there was still a fair amount of debate and a fair amount of resistance to that thesis within the intelligence community, as it's so-called. But from the get go, I think the instinctive reaction of the people I was covering was that this was an Al Qaeda operation. So I started looking at the attack on the Cole as an example of Al Qaeda terrorism.

"I learned that the Al Qaeda Cole attack was not exactly a hugely efficient operation, and I learned later on that there had been an earlier attempt to take out the Cole or another American ship that had floundered badly because of poor Al Qaeda training. Because of incidents like that – you know, overloading a dinghy that was supposed to go have gone out to the ship and blow it up, so that the dinghy would sink – people tended to discount Al Qaeda. They said, 'Oh, they are just a bunch of amateurs." But I'd never thought that. I never believed that. And the people I was covering didn't think that ...

"I had begun to hear rumors about intensified intercepts and tapping of telephones. But that was just vaguest kind of rumors in the street, indicators ... I remember the weekend before July 4, 2001 in particular, because for some reason the people who were worried about Al Qaeda believed that was the weekend that there was going to be an attack on the US or on major American target somewhere. It was going to be a large, well-coordinated attack. 

Because of the July 4th holiday, this was an ideal opportunistic target and date for Al Qaeda. My sources also told me at that time that there had been a lot of chatter overheard – I didn't know specifically what that meant – but a lot of talk about an impending attack at one time or another. And the intelligence community seemed to believe that at least a part of the attack was going to come on July 4th. So I remember that, for a lot of my sources, this was going to be a 'lost' weekend. Everybody was going to be working; nobody was going to take time off. And that was bad news for me because it meant I was also going to be on stand-by and I would be working too.

"I was in New York, but I remember coming down to D.C. one day that weekend, just to be around in case something happened ... Misery loves company, is how I would put it. If it were going to be a stress-filled weekend, it was better to do it together. It also meant I wouldn't have trouble tracking people down – or as much trouble – because as you know, some of these people can be very elusive.

"The people in the counter-terrorism (CT) office were very worried about attacks here in the United States, and that was, it struck me, another debate in the intelligence community. Because a lot of intelligence people did not believe that Al Qaeda had the ability to strike within the United States. The CT people thought they were wrong. But I got the sense at that time that the counter-terrorism people in the White House were viewed as extremist on these views.

"You know sometimes in journalism you regret the stories you do; but most of the time you regret the ones that you didn't do."

"Everyone in Washington was very spun-up in the CT world at that time. I think everybody knew that an attack was coming – everyone who followed this. But you know you can only 'Cry wolf' within a newspaper or, I imagine, within an intelligence agency, so many times before people start saying there he goes – or there she goes – again!

"Sometimes, you wonder about why people tell you things and why people ... we always wonder why people leak things, but that's a very common motivation in Washington. I remember once when I was a reporter in Egypt, and someone from the Agency gave me very good material on terrorism and local Islamic groups.

"I said, 'Why are you doing this? Why are you giving this to me?' and he said, 'I just can't get my headquarters to pay attention to me but I know that if it's from the New York Times, they're going to give it a good read and ask me questions about it.'

And there's also this genuine concern about how, if only the President shared the sense of panic and concern that they did, more would be done to try and protect the country.
"This was a case wherein some serious preparations were made in terms of getting the message out and responding, because at the end of that week, there was a sigh of relief. As somebody metaphorically put it: 'They uncorked the White House champagne' that weekend because nothing had happened. We got through the weekend ... nothing had happened.

"But I did manage to have a conversation with a source that weekend. The person told me that there was some concern about an intercept that had been picked up. The incident that had gotten everyone's attention was a conversation between two members of Al Qaeda. And they had been talking to one another, supposedly expressing disappointment that the United States had not chosen to retaliate more seriously against what had happened to the Cole. And one Al Qaeda operative was overheard saying to the other, 'Don't worry; we're planning something so big now that the US will have to respond.'

"And I was obviously floored by that information. I thought it was a very good story: (1) the source was impeccable; (2) the information was specific, tying Al Qaeda operatives to, at least, knowledge of the attack of the Cole; and (3) they were warning that something big was coming, to which the United States would have to respond. This struck me as a major Page One-potential story.

"I remember going back to work in New York the next day and meeting with my editor Stephen Engelberg. I was rather excited, as I usually get about information of this kind, and I said, 'Steve, I think we have a great story. And the story is that two members of Al Qaeda overheard on an intercept (and I assumed that it was the National Security Agency, because that's who does these things) were heard complaining about the lack of American response to the Cole, but also ... contemplating what would happen the next time, when there was, as they said, the impending major attack that was being planned. They said this was such a big attack that the US would have to respond.' Then I waited.

"And Stephen said, 'That's great! Who were the guys overheard?'

"I said, 'Well, I don't know. I just know that they were both Al Qaeda operatives.'

"'Where were they overheard?' Steve asked.

"Well, I didn't know where the two individuals were. I didn't know what countries they were in; I didn't know whether they were having a local call or a long distance call.

"'What was the attack they were planning?' he said. 'Was it domestic, was it international, was it another military target, was it a civilian target?' I didn't know.

"'Had they discussed it?'

"I didn't know, and it was at that point that I realized that I didn't have the whole story. As Steve put it to me, 'You have a great first and second paragraph. What's your third?"'

Stephen Engelberg confirms Miller's tale in all respects. Engelberg first mentioned the incident in an article by Douglas McCollam in the October, 2005 edition of Columbia Journalism Review, which noted:

"Miller was naturally excited about the scoop and wanted the Times to go with the story. Engelberg, himself a veteran intelligence reporter, wasn't so sure. There had been a lot of chatter about potential attacks; how did they know this was anything other than big talk? Who were these guys? What country were they in? How had we gotten the intercept? Miller didn't have any answers and Engelberg didn't think they could publish without more context. Miller agreed to try and find out more, but in the end the story never ran."

In a recent interview with the authors, Engelberg expanded on his comments. "I recall thinking it made perfect sense at the time," Engelberg told us. "The Cole attack was out of character – unlike the Africa embassy attacks, the Millennium plot, the earlier World Trade Center bombing.

"That weekend, pre-4th of July, everybody was nervous," said Engelberg. "Judy went down to check with the White House and the NSC types at the Old Executive Office Building and CTC. And she came back in and had the story. And I knew the source.

"Judy had two guys talking, but no names or details," Engelberg recalled. "One guy says, 'The US didn't retaliate for the Cole.' And the other guy says the coming attack 'will be so big they're gonna have to retaliate.' But no details ... Judy had the what, but not the who and the where.

"I said, 'Check with the CIA, NSA, DIA,'" Engelberg remembered. "But we couldn't get anything that week."

Interview with Judy Miller: "I realized that this information was enormously sensitive, and that it was going to be difficult to get more information, but that my source undoubtedly knew more. So I promised to Steve that I would go back and try to get more. And I did ... try.

"He knew who my source was. He knew that the source was impeccable. I had also confirmed from a second source that such a conversation had taken place – that there was such an intercept – though my second source did not seem to know as much about the content of the intercept as the first source did. But that was enough for me to know that there was a good story there.

"But whoever knew about the 'who' and the 'where' was not willing tell me at that time. After the fact I was told that, 'The bad guys were in Yemen on this conversation.' I didn't know that at that time. I remember knowing that the person who've told me seemed to know who had been overheard, but he was not about to share that information with me ...

[WSM, 2011: Judy's no-longer-quite-so-secret White House source who had tipped her off during the 2001 July 4th holiday in a rather desperate attempt to draw Presidential attention to what turned out to be two stunningly prophetic, top-level NSA-Al Qaeda 'chatter' intercepts--were 'ethos-culled' sat phone calls between Afghanistan and the key Al Qaeda 'operations switchboard' in Yemen.
It would later develop that the Yemeni out-sourced call center was run by the father-in-law of one of the 9/11 hijackers, whose own  frequent long-distance calls had also been digitally captured, BUT NOT further REPORTED because a certain CIA official  would not allow his FBI counter-terror-counter-part to convey this sensitive intelligence to the law enforcement side of the FBI CT operations.
TBAR is the NSA's internal, if unofficial, all-cap CRYPTONYM for the CIA--'Those Bastards Across the RIVER.']
 "And Washington being Washington and the CT world being the CT world, I was soon off pursuing other things. I simply couldn't nail it down with more specificity. I argued at that time that it was worth going with just what we had, even if it was vague, that the fact that the Al Qaeda was planning something that was so spectacular that we have to respond was worth getting into the paper in some way, shape or form. But I think Steve decided and I ultimately agreed that we needed more details. And I simply couldn't pry them loose.

"At the time I also had had a book coming out (Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War, with William Broad and Stephen Engelberg). Steve, Bill Broad and I were co-authors of a book about biological terrorism. So we were working flat out on that book trying to meet our deadline. I was desperately trying to get my arms around this series that we were trying to do on Al Qaeda. I was having a lot of trouble because the information was very hard to come by. There was a lot going on. I was also doing biological weapons stories and homeland security stories. And in Washington, if you don't have a sense of immediacy about something and if you sense that there is bureaucratic resistance to a story, you tend to focus on areas of less resistance.

"Our pub date was September 10th. I remember I was very worried about whether or not the publisher was actually going to get copies of the books to the warehouses in time. Because of course, Steve, Bill and I had delivered the manuscript late – everything was very late.

"The morning of September 11, I was downtown about 12 blocks from the World Trade Center. I remember walking to a school around the corner with a very clear view of the World Trade Center, because it was just a few blocks away. And all I can remember thinking was, 'Are they going to get those books to the warehouses on time?' I was also trying to make up my mind whom I was going to vote for in the New York Democratic Primary. And – everybody says this – it was one of most beautiful days in New York I ever remember!

"When I got to the Baxter School, there were people standing out in front of the school, pointing at the World Trade Center, which was on fire, and I looked up. I asked what had happened, and they said that a plane had hit the World Trade Center. There was an awfully big gash in the building and, I didn't see the plane, but there was an awful lot of smoke and I thought, 'Gosh! That was a pretty big space for a Cessna or something to have gotten into that building.'

"And here I had spent my whole summer, my whole past year thinking about an Al Qaeda attack, and I yet wouldn't let myself believe that it was happening right then. I simply wouldn't believe. So I turned around without voting, without going into the building, and I started to call my CT sources in Washington and I remember reaching the counter-terrorism office at the White House and I was told that nobody was there, that all of the principals were out giving speeches, or doing something else. And I said, 'Okay, I'll try to call back in 15 minutes.'

"By that time I walked to my house a couple of blocks away and I heard a boom and I turned around and once again, I didn't see the plane, but I saw the fire shoot out from the building from the plane.

"It was only then, after the second plane hit, that I allowed myself to believe that it really was a terrorist attack – the attack that we had been so worried about for so long. And I think I was kind of amazed at myself, at the power of denial. When you don't want to believe something's happening, it does not, it's not happening! And I think that was what was going on in the intelligence community. The idea that Al Qaeda would actually strike in the United States, not at the Cole or overseas, or in Jordan as part of a warning bombing plot, but here in the US, that was just kind of unthinkable! People were in the state of denial, as I was that morning.

"I remember calling back the White House that morning, and at that point, I talked to the secretary in the counter-terrorism office and she said: 'Nobody's here, Judy, and we're evacuating this building. I gotta go. Bye.' At that point, I hadn't even heard about the Pentagon attack, but I knew.

"It was very strange ... it was a strange feeling to have written a series that virtually predicted this, and to have had not a single other reporter call, not a single other newspaper follow-up on some of the information that we had broken in that series. 

At the time of the series, which was published in January 2001, we had information about chemical and biological experiments at Al Qaeda camps. We had gotten the location of the camps, we had gotten satellite overhead of the camps. I had interviewed, in Afghanistan, Al Qaeda-trained people who said that they were going to get out of the 'prison' in Afghanistan and go back and continue their jihad. They had talked about suicide bombings. We had Jordanian intelligence say that attempts to blow up hotels, roads and tourist targets in Jordan over the millennium was part of the Al Qaeda planned attack. And yet I guess people just didn't believe it. But I believed it. I believed it absolutely, because I've covered these militants for so long. There was nothing they wouldn't do if they could do it."

Like Judy Miller, Steve Engelberg, now managing editor of The Oregonian in Portland, still thinks about that story that got away. "More than once I've wondered what would have happened if we'd run the piece?" he told the CJR. "A case can be made that it would have been alarmist and I just couldn't justify it, but you can't help but think maybe I made the wrong call."

Engelberg told us the same thing. "On September 11th, I was standing on the platform at the 125th Street station," he remembered ruefully more than four years later. "I was with a friend and we both saw the World Trade Center burning and saw the second one hit. 'It's Al-Qaeda!' I yelled. 'We had a heads up!' So yes, I do still have regrets."

So does Judy Miller.

"I don't remember what I said to Steve on September 11," she concluded in her interview with us. "I don't think we said anything at all to each other. He just knew what I was thinking and I knew what he was thinking. We were so stunned by what was happening, and there was so much to do, and I think that was the day in which words just fail you.

"So I sometimes think back, and Steve and I have talked a few times about the fact that that story wasn't fit and that neither one of us pursued it at that time with the kind of vigor and determination that we would have had we known what was going to happen.
 
"And I always wondered how the person who sent that [intercept] warning must have felt.*

"You know sometimes in journalism you regret the stories you do; but most of the time you regret the ones that you didn't do."

[*- WSM, 2011: The very military intelligence official who in fact made sure that that intercept-intelligence was passed to the CIA and the WHITE HOUSE's Scooter LIBBY in the first place was the source who pointed Malone and O'Connor to interview Judy Miller on this precise question in the first place also.
MUCH MORE on this still untold CRIMINAL 9/11 OBSTRUCTION of JUSTICE SCANDAL to come NEXT Month on the BlackNET Intelligence Channel.

And NAMES NAMED. Stay tuned...]
— William Scott Malone is a multiple Emmy and Peabody award-winning investigative journalist who is currently the senior editor of NavySEALs.com and its counter-terrorism newsletter 'BlackNET Intelligence.' Rory O'Connor is an award-winning documentary filmmaker and journalist whose 'Media Is A Plural' blog is accessible at www.roryoconnor.org.

© 2006 William Scott Malone and Rory O'Connor

Monday, June 13, 2011

WashPOST: Code Name Catastrophe

- OPEN SOURCE  US/1




January 24, 1989

Code Name Catastrophe


THE COLD WAR between the United States and the Soviet Union may be winding down, but the spy war between them continues. And there's new evidence  that America may have suffered greater damage in this secret war than is generally recognized.

The Soviets appear to have obtained access to the most deeply held U.S.
secret of all -- the codes used to protect our sensitive government  messages. U.S. intelligence and law-enforcement officials say they base  this analysis on a careful review of the 1985 John Walker spy case, which leads them to two disturbing conclusions:

" The United States hasn't caught all the Soviet code spies. More Walker
are probably out there, still undetected. Investigators reached this judgment because of indications that Moscow had other, and perhaps better, sources of U.S. "crypto" secrets than the Walker spy ring.

" The Soviets have broken some supposedly "unbreakable" cipher systems.

Investigators believe that by piecing together technical information  provided by Walker and his associates, the Soviets have been able to  replicate U.S. hardware and read at least some of our secret message  traffic -- a feat that U.S. officials once believed was impossible. " A sign of America's continuing espionage problem came during the past month, with the arrest of U.S. Army Warrant Officer James W. Hall III in Georgia and former Navy chief petty officer Craig D. Kunkle in Virginia. Kunkle, who was arrested during an FBI sting operation two weeks ago, didn't actually pass secrets to the KGB, so he isn't believed to have caused any real damage. But Hall's alleged espionage, if true, was of a far more damaging nature. As an Army signals-intelligence specialist, Hall had access to super-secret U.S. cryptographic machines and keylists, more commonly known as codes and ciphers.

The Walker case showed just how vulnerable these code systems are. John A.
Walker Jr., a onetime Navy warrant officer, spied for the KGB for almost 20 years before he was arrested in May 1985, after his ex-wife turned him in to the FBI. Walker had recruited his brother, his 20-year-old son and his best friend into his spy ring.

"It was the greatest case in KGB history," former KGB defector Vitaly
Yurchenko told his American debriefers in 1985. "We deciphered millions of your messages. If there had been a war, we would have won it."

"K-Mart has better security than the U.S. Navy," Walker told us during a
series of interviews last August for a PBS "Frontline" documentary on the Soviet espionage threat. He noted that he used to tell his partner, Jerry Whitworth, that selling U.S. secrets "was a buyers' market."

What worries Phillip Parker, the former FBI deputy assistant director for

counterintelligence who supervised the Walker case, is that the KGB's handling of Walker demonstrated that he was not their most important agent. "He was just another messenger boy," says Parker. "There are no doubt other John Walkers still out there," agrees a National Security Agency (NSA) official.

From Walker's very first visit to the Soviet Embassy in Washington in
December 1967, it was obvious the Soviets were intimately familiar with America's top-secret codes. When Walker, at that first meeting, presented a copy of a Navy keylist stamped "Top Secret Specat [Special Category]," the KGB security officer immediately wanted to know why there was no "Letter of Promulgation" signature on the back of the keylist. It took the
startled spy a few moments to realize that the NSA had recently discontinued the signature practice.

As with the famous Sherlock Holmes case in which the crucial clue was a
dog that didn't bark, the most important thing about the Walker case may be the questions the KGB didn't ask him. "I can only deduce that they were getting their information from somewhere else," Walker eventually concluded.

"The NSA boys went pale when I told them about the Russians not wanting
anything on the [then most advanced machines]. It meant that it had already been compromised," says Walker. Such a conclusion offers perhaps the most disturbing implication for U.S. security, since a new generationof U.S. code machines had begun to go into service by the early 1980s with the Air Force, Army, Navy and NATO.

To assess the damage done by Walker and the other spies, it's necessary to
understand a bit about the arcane science of cryptology. Experts say there are two basic elements to a modern code system: the logic and the key. The humming, Navy-gray code machines contain what is in essence an electronic formula (or algorithm) called the logic. The key is a list of numbers and letters that set the machine and tell the logic formula when to commence. To maximize security, U.S. keylists are changed every 24 hours.

The machines themselves, along with their associated "technical manuals,"
while closely guarded, are usually not top-secret, because they are distributed around the world and their designers assume they will eventually be lost or stolen. The NSA has long presumed that no machine by itself could be used to read a coded message -- without that day's
keylist. Keylists thus become the object of intense classification and protection.

"In the context of communications information, the keylist is considered
the ultimate," recalled Walker's convicted cohort Jerry Whitworth in an interview for the "Frontline" documentary. "The only other thing that's better would be the keylist, tech manual and the equipment. Then you've got the whole shebang."

"Obviously you can't steal the equipment," explains Walker, "so the next
best thing would be to give them the technical manual. From the technical manual, you can build the equipment by a process of [reverse] engineering."

Walker did just that. Using a Minox camera, he supplied the Soviets with
all the technical manuals he could lay his hands on. "They got the original technical manuals from me and I provided them with amendments [and] modifications to that equipment as they occurred over the years," says Walker. "When Mr. Whitworth took over, he continued to provide those changes basically to the [KWR-]37 and to the [KW-]7" code machines.

The Soviets still needed the daily keylists, but Walker, and later
Whitworth, kept them amply supplied. Whitworth let his pride show when discussing a $ 10,000 bonus Walker paid him for providing "months" of continuous keylists. "The bonus thing came up over a period of having years of consistency -- not months, but years," he says.

The NSA had thought that even if this sort of breach occurred, the damage
would be limited. Earl David Clark, the former chief of NSA's Office of Communications Security, testified during Whitworth's trial in 1986: "We design our systems [so] that without a key, we are highly confident that no one can read these communications . . . . You would only be able to exploit those communications for which you have that logic [tech manual]
and keying material in which those communications were encrypted. [You] could not read tomorrow's traffic if [you] didn't have tomorrow's key . . . ."

Clark's confidence may have been misplaced. According to Navy officials,
the internal design logic of some machines was indeed compromised by the Walker spy ring, and the Soviets were able to read secret U.S. messages without the keylists. Adm. James D. Watkins, then chief of naval operations, obliquely acknowledged the compromise during a June 1985 press briefing. According to Watkins, loss of the cryptographic logic designs was "the most serious area of compromise. Some technical design communications information has probably been lost."

Four months later, after Walker began cooperating with damage-assessment
officials, then Navy secretary John Lehman was more specific: "We assume that the Soviets were able to compromise the design logic of some of the cryptographic machines, which would enable them in some cases to crack the code without key cards. And we assume they have."

One of the compromised systems was the most widely used code machine of
all, the KW-7, a fact recently confirmed to us by four past or present NSA officials. Although the KW-7 has been replaced, it was once the mainstay of crypto-communications for the entire government. It was also used to communicate with many of our NATO allies. In addition to the KW-7, two NSA officials said that the reliability of the Navy's older KWR-37, used for
one-way, shore-to-ship "Fleet Broadcast" messages, has also been completely written off.

These two code machines were not compromised by the so-called
"brute-force" method, which entails having supercomputers run through every possible keylist combination. Rather, the Soviets apparently had so much material -- including the KW-7 hardware, keylists and plain-text versions of messages sent on the system -- that they were able to exploit "design flaws" in the KW-7's logic that allowed them to do what the NSA
had once believed impossible -- "break" the machine's code formula without use of the daily keylist.

"The Soviets have always been reputed to be rather good in code breaking,"
says David Kahn, author of "The Codebreakers." "It's known that three things seem to be associated with success in code-breaking: musicianship, chess and mathematics. What are the three things the Russians are best at?"

Collectively, Walker and Whitworth supplied some six virtually continuous
years of keylists for the KW-7 and KWR-37. Walker says he also provided the Soviets the technical manuals, complete with the precise schematics of the design logic, for the KW-7 and the KWR-37 systems. All subsequent KW-7 and KWR-37 equipment modifications were provided by Whitworth, both spies now confirm.

The Soviets had also obtained actual working versions of these machines.
The United States lost both KW-7 and KWR-37 machines in January 1968, when North Korean gunboats seized the U.S. spy ship USS Pueblo for allegedly violating their territorial waters, and at least one other KW-7 was lost in Vietnam in the early 1970s, according to court testimony and Navy documents. So the "design logic" was unquestionably compromised, even when later modified.

The NSA's position at the time, according to former communications
security chief Clark, was that even with one of the seized KW-7s, the Soviets "wouldn't be able to decrypt it unless they had a correct key." But within weeks after the Pueblo was seized, the KGB's codebreaking Department 16 had the KW-7's worldwide keylists, courtesy of their newly
recruited spy, Warrant Officer John Walker.

While the Soviets never told Walker how successful their U.S. codebreaking
efforts had been, they did once tell him when their KWR-37 replica machine had stopped reading secret U.S. messages in early 1980. Walker and Whitworth subsequently decided the problem stemmed from a new security device called a "Card Reader Insert Board," into which a keylist was placed and then reattached to the machine. Whitworth then sketched this new board and sent it on to Walker.

"I provided a diagram, a tracing . . . of the card reader," Whitworth
admits when pressed. "That's true." The Soviets had no further complaints about reading the KWR-37 Fleet Broadcast messages.

By early 1984, the KGB's wish-list for Walker was narrowing. During a
chilly meeting outside a Vienna mens' shop, Walker's KGB handler told him they still wanted "7 subsystems" (KW-7 hardware modifications), as well as naval operational orders and plans.

And, in a request that once again seemed to demonstrate the Soviets still
had better access to U.S. secrets than either Walker or Whitworth, the KGB agent asked for copies of something called an "NCM," which Walker says stood for some sort of "crypto-related 'National Command Memorandum.'" Neither Walker nor Whitworth had ever heard of this item before.

Fortunately, Walker and Whitworth did not have NSA "crypto clearances,"
and therefore never had access to the so-called "Blue Channel," used for super-sensitive "special intelligence" information. The Navy employs an entirely separate communications system on ships and bases for such messages, although the systems did use some of the same equipment, including the KW-7 and the KWR-37.

The severe damage done by the Walker ring probably ended several years
before they were caught. In the early 1980s, the NSA introduced various safeguards, including canister-type keylist dispensers, that prevented someone from removing a keylist and later returning it; "limited" technical manuals, which contained no logic diagrams; and unphotographable types of keylists for the Navy's new, advanced code machines.

Walker now says the creators of those inovations "should be awarded
medals." High praise indeed.

But the demise of the Walker ring didn't stop the KGB. At about the same
time Walker's crypto supply to the Soviets ended, Army Warrant Officer James Hall had just come on line in Berlin. As a signals-intelligence specialist for the NSA's military subsidiary, the Army Security Agency, Hall had access to a broad array of U.S. crypto systems, including the
KW-7, according to sources. U.S. sources say that Hall has apparently admitted supplying "important signal-intelligence information" to the KGB's proxies in East Germany from late 1982 to early 1988. Hall is now said to be cooperating with authorities.

What's ominous is that early last year, Hall apparently was told by his
Soviet controllers "to cool off his activities." "Hall was flushed," concludes one intelligence source. "There's still someone else out there."

The likelihood that the codebreakers of the KGB's Department 16 were "not
only able to copy, but were able to solve" U.S. codes, deeply worries Kean College mathematics professor Cipher Deavours, long close to the secret world of codes and the editor of Cryptologia. "The main assumptions under which the National Security Agency [operates] is that even if the enemy has possession of the machine, he won't be able to read any traffic without the key. That assumption was wrong. And our entire crypto-design
philosophy is built on that."

"You have to assume they're certainly not arresting everybody," says
Walker, from his cell in the isolation block of the most secure federal prison at Marion, Ill. "There are obviously other spy rings out there and other players. The fact that there were cryptographic systems and other types of systems that they didn't want is clearly evidence that they had
other sources."

William Scott Malone and William Cran are Emmy-award-winning producers for PBS' "Frontline." They spent almost a  year investigating the Walker case for the upcoming "The Spy Who Broke The Code," which will air next Tuesday on PBS.


http://www.navyseals.com/code-name-catastrophe

David Johnson Vandenberg

David Johnson Vandenberg
Stars and Stripes 22 X 30 oil on Canvas .................................. A Patriot BORN...